"Al-Farabi of Baghdad (c. 870-950) is the first major representative of the medieval Arabic Aristotelianism which came to influence the Christian West so profoundly. In the Islamic world his writings on logic set the pattern for the future and virtually created Islamic philosophy. He is also important as a witness to the study of Aristotle in late antiquity, demonstrating a knowledge of Galen and the exegetical tradition of Porphyry. This translation is based on a fresh study of the Arabic (...) manuscripts. An introduction and notes make this intriguing document accessible to all for whom it contains important matter.Classicists, historians of philosophy and logic, medievalists, Arabists, students of Islamic thought."--. (shrink)

Selected aphorisms -- Enumeration of the sciences, chapter 5 -- Book of religion -- The harmonization of the two opinions of the two sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle.

De scientiis: translation by Gerard of Cremona of (romanized: Ibsā al-ʻulūm)--De intellectu et intellecto: anonymous translation of (romanized: Risālah fi al-ʻaql).

We reconstruct as much as we can the part of al-Fārābī's treatment of modal logic that is missing from the surviving pages of his Long Commentary on the Prior Analytics. We use as a basis the quotations from this work in Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides, together with relevant material from al-Fārābī's other writings. We present a case that al-Fārābī's treatment of the dictum de omni had a decisive effect on the development and presentation of Ibn Sīnā's modal logic. (...) We give further evidence that the Harmonisation of the Opinions of Plato and Aristotle was not written by al-Fārābī. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that Ibn Bāǧǧa’s commentaries on al- Fārābī’s logical writings reveal a perpetuation of al-Fārābī’s logic in Andalusia and that they also assist us in the recognition of the nature and achievement of this logic. Ibn Bāǧǧa’s Introduction or Eisagoge is a commentary on al-Fārābī’s introductory Letter and the Five Aphorisms, as well as subsequent logical treatises of al-Fārābī. Ibn Bāǧǧa, in agreement with al-Fārābī, presents logic as consisting of five syllogistic arts, (...) rhetoric, poetry, dialectic, sophistry and demonstration. These arts are constituted by both the form and matter of logic, the matter referring to the five syllogistic arts in which the form of logic is employed. Ibn Ḫaldūn later testifies to this comprehensive account of the five syllogistic arts articulated primarily by al-Fārābī but also in some measure by Ibn Sīnā, and says that, by his time, this account of the syllogistic arts had been replaced by a more limited a... (shrink)

In this dissertation we observe the diachronic development of certain vocabulary items which form the basis of discourse in Islamic philosophy in the Arabic language. Using a set of philosophical terms from al-Kindi, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina we analyze the use of each term, first individually and then comparatively. To examine philosophical terms in their natural setting, we will look at the philosophers' own definitions of these terms. Thus, we observe how definitions and their use change over two centuries, (...) both in the references made in definitions and in the words selected for their definientia. This development and the enduring effect of the philosophers' definitions in Islamic philosophy will form the focus of our study. ;This dissertation deals with the development of a technical philosophical vocabulary in the Arabic language; it is not primarily a hunt for the Hellenistic origin of the words or ideas. Prior to the translation of Greek philosophical texts into the Arabic language, Arabic lacked the vocabulary to speculate on these ideas. This was not an unusual state of affairs, as philosophy was not a discipline developed by the Arabic language writers prior to the translations of Greek philosophical texts. To speculate about metaphysics, philosophers need words for the objects of metaphysics: substance, cause and matter--terms which form the center of our study. ;An Arabic vocabulary was the tool the philosophers needed to discuss the concepts, ideas and premises brought to them by philosophy, an imported science, without a pre-existing vocabulary in Arabic. For purposes of this study we will focus on language as the tool of philosophy. (shrink)

Habitus is a logical and ethical Aristotelian concept that was first introduced to the Islamic world through the translation of Greek philosophical works into Arabic in the ninth century. Following its introduction and until the nineteenth century, thinkers and scholars of the Islamic world naturalized it creatively in various intellectual systems. In ethical usage, habitus is a disposition that, once acquired and well established through a process of accustoming, allows humans to perceive and act in certain ways without deliberation or (...) reflection. This concept explained how humans transcended their inborn natures, and as such it was amenable to employment in manifold fields and contexts. The present article studies significant applications from the ninth to the nineteenth century by thinkers of the Islamic world, who fleshed out the Aristotelian concept and used it for their own purposes. Among other things, it shows that the two main trends of naturalization involved application of the concept to religious Islamic discourses and to the study of humans and their society, anticipating modern Western sociological usage. (shrink)

This volume constitutes an attempt at bringing together philosophies of time—or more precisely, philosophies on time and, in a concomitant way, history—emerging from Christianity’s and Islam’s intellectual histories. Starting from the Neoplatonic heritage and the voice of classical philosophy, the volume enters the Byzantine and Arabic intellectual worlds up to Ibn Al-Arabi’s times. A conscious choice in this volume is not to engage with, perhaps, the most prominent figures of Christian and Arabic philosophy, i.e., Augustine on the one hand and (...) Avicenna/Ibn Sina on the other, precisely because these have attracted so much attention due to their prominence in their respective traditions—and beyond. In a certain way, Maximus the Confessor and Ibn Al-Arabi—together with Al-Fārābi—emerge as alternative representatives of their two traditions in this volume, offering two axes for this endeavor. The synthesis of those approaches on time and history, their comparison rather than their mere co-existence, is left to the reader’s critical inquiry and philosophical investigation. (shrink)

Ibn Rušd a consacré un certain nombre de travaux auxPremiers Analytiquesd'Aristote. Dans une série d'opusculesconsécutifs à sonCommentaire moyendesAPr.et dont la rédaction s'étale sur plus de vingt ans il s'est trouvé confronté à un problème spécifique à la syllogistique modale, celui du mode de la conclusion dans les syllogismes mixtes.Le problème peut se poser ainsi: Aristote a établi au début d'APr.un principe formel de déduction, le principe d'attribution universelle (APr.I, 1, 24b26'30). Appliqué dans la syllogistique modale ce principe tel quel s'avère (...) insuffisant. Sa généralité ne permet pas de l'appliquer de manière univoque dans tous les syllogismes modaux. Les commentateurs ont dû l'interpreter pour garder une cohérence aux declarations d'Aristote. Exposant les interpretations des commentateurs, principalement al-Fārābī et Alexandra, à partir duGrand commentaired'al-Fārābī auxAPr., Ibn Rušd les critique respectivement. Appliqué selon l'interpretation d'Alexandre, le principe d'attribution universelle n'est valable que pour les syllogismes modaux dont une des prémisses est nécessaire, l'autre assertorique; suivant l'interprétation d'al-Fārābī, il ne se vérifie que dans le cas où la mineure est possible. Averroès propose quant à lui d'abord deux premieres solutions. Ce principe formel de déduction aurait des conditions d'application differentes suivant les differences modales des prémisses mineures dans les syllogismes mixtes (première solution), ou aurait deux acceptions, l'une générale et l'autre propre a chaque modalité (deuxieme solution). Ces solutions ne sont pas satisfaisantes car elles mettent en cause l'unité et l'universalité du principe d'attribution universelle tel qu'Aristote l'a établi. Quelle est l'utilité, s'interroge Averroès, d'un principe qui ne se vérifie pas pour toutes les modalités ou qui ne s'applique pas à toutes les prémisses, dès lors que le traité desAPr.doit fournir des principes formels et universels de déduction? Et pourquoi Aristote a-t-il défini le principe d'attribution universelle sans différencier son application selon chacune des trois premisses modales? Revenant a la fin de sa carriere a une exegese litterale des propos d'Aristote et sans rappeler les solutions précédentes, il propose une théorie de la modalisation des termes (quatrieme solution) pour sauver la littéralité des déclarations d'Aristote relatives au principe d'attribution universelle et au mode de la conclusion des syllogismes mixtes (APr., I, 9, 30al5–20). Bien que formellement insuffisante cette solution, qui a eu une postérité, propose une réflexion nouvelle sur la classification des propositions modales. (shrink)

The “lost” Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī treatises recently discovered in the Tehran codex Marwī 19 include a record of a philosophical debate instigated by the Ḥamdānid prince Sayf-al-Dawla. More precisely, Marwī 19 contains Yaḥyā’s adjudication of a dispute between an unnamed Opponent and Yaḥyā’s younger relative Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAdī (who also served as al-Fārābī’s assistant), along with Ibrāhīm's response to Yaḥyā’s adjudication, and Yaḥyā’s final word. At issue was a problem of Aristotelian exegesis: should “body” be understood as falling under the (...) category of substance or under the category of quantity? The unnamed Opponent argues that body is a species of substance; Ibrāhīm argues that technically speaking, body is a species of quantity, and hence an accident; and Yaḥyā judges that body is a species of substance, though for very different reasons than the Opponent gives. For the first time, the Arabic text of this exchange is edited and translated into English. Also provided is an Introduction that sets the debate in historical context, and discusses in particular the possible influence of John Philoponus. The debate is interesting and important not only because of the philosophical ramifications of the issues under discussion, but because it constitutes evidence of dialectical practice among Arabic-speaking philosophers from the middle of the 10th century. (shrink)

RésuméIl est bien connu que les notions detaṣawwur(conceptualisation) et detaṣdīq(assentiment) sont tout à fait centrales dans l’épistémologie de la philosophie arabo-islamique. La “conceptualisation” désigne la définition d'un objet de connaissance, et l’“assentiment” la reconnaissance de la véracité de la définition, par un raisonnement d'un certain type. Parmi les auteurs ayant traité ces deux thèmes le plus en profondeur figure al-Fārābī, qui a exercé sur Ibn Bājja une influence décisive. Cet article analyse les passages relatifs àtaṣawwurettaṣdīqdans les notes d'Ibn Bājja aux (...) écrits de logique et de méthodologie scientifique d'al-Fārābī, en particulier ses gloses auKitāb al-Burhān. On montre ainsi qu'Ibn Bājja a parfaitement saisi l'importance de ces deux termes dans la lecture farabienne de la méthode scientifique aristotélicienne, et qu'il les a employés pour traiter de certaines activités mentales. En effet ces deux notions, centrales chez Ibn Bājja, sont à la base de certaines de ses œuvres les plus fameuses. (shrink)

The passionate and staunch defence of logic of the controversial thinker Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd of Córdoba (384-456/994-1064), had lasting consequences in the Islamic world. Indeed, his book Facilitating the Understanding of the Rules of Logic and Introduction Thereto, with Common Expressions and Juristic Examples (Kitāb al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq wa-l-mudkhal ilayhi bi-l-alfāẓ al-ʿāmmiyya wa-l-amthila al-fiqhiyya), composed in 1025-1029, was well known and discussed during and after his time; and it paved the way for the studies (...) of his compatriots Ibn Bājjah (d. 1138), Ibn Ṭufayl (1185), and Ibn Rushd (1198), who each gave demonstrative reasoning a privileged place within the methods of attaining knowledge. Unfortunately, as too often in the history of science, Ibn Ḥazm’s innovative perspectives and contributions in logic have been overlooked or considered with an attitude of contempt. On the one hand, his work has been seen, at best, as promulgating the benefits of studying Aristotle’s logic, so that his contribution is assessed as more didactical than conceptual. And on the other hand, those who do examine his innovations often consider them to be mistaken. As indicated by Chejne (1984, p. 2) contempt towards the logical work of Ibn Ḥazm was also present in its reception by the Eastern philosophers who accused him of deviating from Aristotelian logic and of dabbling in things beyond his capability. However, a reassessment of his work on logic has since begun, by delving into the ways the thinker of Córdoba studied the links between deontic and modal qualification of propositions. In this context Lameer’s (2013) paper on the logical sources of Ibn Ḥazm is worth mentioning; the author (p. 417, footnote 1) observes that, although, strictly speaking, it was al-Fārābī who first drew the parallelism between deontic and modal concepts, it was Ibn Ḥazm who developed it and worked it out in a more precise manner. A primary aim of this paper is to help fill some of these gaps by stressing the role of the work of Ibn Ḥazm in developing a notion of deontic necessity deeply rooted in legal normativity, and in explicitly discussing the transference between deontic and modal concepts. According to our view; the basic units of Islamic deontic logic are what we might call, indulging in terminological anachronism, heteronomous imperatives. As it turns out, the heteronomy of imperatives within Islamic legal systems contrasts with those of the purely moral realm, which seem to be closer to an autonomous conception of moral law. There it concurs again with Leibniz’s proposal to define obligatory as “what is necessary for a good person to do”. In the present paper, we will focus on the heteronomous imperatives of legal systems rather than on the imperatives of the purely moral realm. In this context, the work of Ibn Ḥazm extends the parallelism between the necessity of events and that of human actions stressed by his predecessors. According to our understanding, Ibn Ḥazm’s parallelism can be rendered explicit formally by means of a conditional (or hypothetical) structure shared by both deontic and modal propositions. Moreover, this structure makes apparent that this parallelism displays an underlying system of “degrees”. Indeed, while in the domain of events, given some conditions, it makes sense to distinguish between an event that is more likely to happen than another. Ibn Ḥazm speaks of near and distant possibility (such as the higher degree of likelihood of rain, given the condensation of clouds in December, and its lower degree, when the condensation occurs in summer); and, in the domain of actions, the Islamic notion of weighting actions determines degrees of virtue (or of legal and moral value). So whereas the degree of virtue of performing a forbidden act as determined by the distribution of sanction and reward is 0, we obtain the same value by pondering the likelihood of an impossible event to take place. Furthermore, as discussed in section II.3.2, the system of values at work in the parallelism can be seen as opening the way to a more direct correspondence. Thus, while in the realm of nature, likelihood of occurrence of an event is dependent upon the conditions specific to the occurrence of that event; while, in the realm of jurisprudence, likelihood of performing an action is dependent upon the distribution of reward and sanction specific to that action (being that, given the choice to perform or not perform a given action, those that will be rewarded are more likely to be performed than those that are not). According to this perspective, the point of the parallelism is that both deontic and modal qualifications measure the degree of an action or event to become actual; that is – indulging once more in anachronism (but this time from the Leibnizian background) – the degree measures how feasible (facile) an action or event may be. This suggests that Ibn Ḥazm’s perspectives already herald the links to probability and possibility explored by Leibniz six centuries later – see for example Leibniz’s (1671, A VI, I, p. 424-26) use of probability in the context of conditional right. Nevertheless, it also shows a crucial difference to the approach developed in the Elementa Jura Naturalis: whereas Leibniz’s studies seek to define what is to be just or virtuous, the logical system of deontic imperatives within Islamic jurisprudence presupposes that what is to be virtuous has already been settled. Determining what is to be virtuous is not achieved by logical reasoning within the system of legal jurisprudence, but by delving into the higher objectives of the Sharīʿa. While developing our point, we will delve into the logical structure of the heteronomous imperatives. This distinguishes our contribution from the existing literature, such as the papers of Chejne (1984), Lameer (2014), and Guerrero (1997, 2010, 2014), which do not provide a logical analysis of the deontic concepts put into work by Ibn Ḥazm. The true antecedent to the present paper is the work of Farid Zidani (2007, 2015), who, so far as we know, was the first to undertake such a task. Some of our own developments and general epistemological thoughts go beyond Ibn Ḥazm’s framework and motivations; mainly those contained in sections II.3.2 and IV. However, according to our view, these reflections suggest that Ibn Ḥazm’s approach has the substance for a broader and deeper exploration of the logic of norms. The paper is structured as follows:I.Ibn Ḥazm’s Logic of Heteronomous Imperatives. After presenting some extracts of the relevant text, we proceed by providing a formal reconstruction of the five forms of deontic modalities. II. A Landmark in the History of the Logical Analysis of Norms. Duties and Modalities. In this section, we study the transferences from deontic to modal necessity and possibility. We briefly compare the deontic system of Islamic Jurisprudence with that of Leibniz.III. Leibniz and Hypothetical Imperatives in Law.IV. Beyond Ibn Ḥazm: Conclusions and the Work Ahead. We will conclude the paper by discussing briefly some conceptual points that distinguish the logic of heteronomous imperatives from contemporary deontic logic. Our final words will discuss deontic-modal parallelism in the context of Ibn Ḥazm’s rejection of reasoning by conjecture and what we call “the internalization of nature.”. (shrink)

Cet article traite de la philosophie de Abū Ḥāmid Ḥāmid Muḥammad Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, l’un des intellectuels les plus célèbres et les plus éminents de l’histoire de la philosophie islamique. Al-Ghazālī était une personnalité particulière, il ne se considérait pas comme un philosophe. Il convient de noter cependant que, comme il l’a fièrement annoncé, il avait une connaissance approfondie du raisonnement philosophique. Dans ses deux ouvrages célèbres, Le but des philosophes et L’incohérence des philosophes, il a présenté un rejet (...) véhément de la philosophie d’Aristote et de Platon, telle qu’elle a été interprétée par al-Fārābī et Ibn Sīnā. En ce qui concerne le problème de l’épistémologie, al-Ghazālī a abordé la question de la relation entre vérité et certitude, et par suite, entre théologie et philosophie. Selon lui, le raisonnement philosophique n’est pas applicable à la connaissance de Dieu et à celle de ses vérités. Cette opinion reflète la longue discussion sur la relation de la théologie avec la philosophie dans l’Islam. L’article évalue cette discussion et la conviction d’al-Ghazālī quant à la supériorité du premier comme étant le pivot du raisonnement d’al-Ghazālī, de son attitude envers ses prédécesseurs en philosophie et de son point de vue intellectuel. (shrink)

İdrak ve niteliği felsefenin en önemli problemlerinden biridir. İbn Sînâ hissî, hayalî, vehmî ve aklî olmak üzere dört farklı idrak mertebesi dillendirir. Buna göre insan nefsi nesnelerin suretlerini duyu yetileriyle algılar. Daha sonra bu suretleri hayal yetisine teslim eder. Akabinde akıl bu sureti barındırdığı maddî eklentilerden arındırarak aklî suretlerin oluşumu için gerekli zeminleri hazırlar. Daha sonra faal akıl insan nefsine aklî suretleri verir. İnsan zihninde duyularla algılanan bu kavramlardan başka kavramlar da vardır. Bu küllî kavramların yeri nesnel âlem değil öznel (...) âlemdir. İslam felsefesi geleneğinde Fârâbî ilk defa bu ayırımı yapar ve ma‘kūlleri birinci ve ikinci ma‘kūller diye iki kısma ayırır. İbn Sînâ da bu sınıflandırmayı benimser ve konu hakkında yeni açıklamalar getirir. İbn Sînâ, ikinci ma‘kūllerin sonraki dönemlerde yapılan felsefî ve mantıkî ayırımını her ne kadar dillendirmese de eserlerinden bu iki ma‘kūl türünün farklılığına teveccüh eder. Bu çalışmada İbn Sînâ felsefesinde idrak olgusunun gerçekleşme niteliği ele alınacak ve daha sonraki dönemlerde dillendirilen ikinci felsefî ma‘kūl anlamların İbn Sînâ felsefesindeki yeri açıklanacaktır. (shrink)

RésuméLe présent article propose la liste des œuvres médicales composées par Ibn Bājja, donne une présentation synthétique de celles qui nous ont été transmises et étudie le métacommentaire au commentaire de Galien sur lesAphorismesd'Hippocrate (Sharḥ fī al-Fuṣūl). Ce texte montre une influence profonde d'al- Fārābī, en particulier dans sa conception de l'expérience médicale, qui remonte à la façon dont ce dernier construit l'expérience (tajriba) comme le procédé inductif, décrit par Aristote dans lesSeconds Analytiques, produisant les prémisses de la démonstration. Sur (...) cette base, Ibn Bājja défend la pertinence d'une médecine moins scolastique et plus empirique, une position dont Ibn Rushd se fera l'écho. Des similitudes entre le texte d'Ibn Bājja et leK. al-Kulliyyāt fī al-ṭibbd'Ibn Rushd suggèrent que celui-ci avait lu leSharḥ fī al-Fuṣūl. Cette œuvre, en outre, pourrait bien attester que la dissection humaine était pratiquée à l'époque d'Ibn Bājja. (shrink)

L'A. confronta due commenti su quello che nel mondo arabo viene considerato il primo libro della Metaphysica di Aristotele: alpha Elatton. Dopo averne delineato i contenuti e la penetrazione nel mondo arabo grazie alle traduzioni di Ustat e Ishaq ibn Hunayn, l'A. esamina due importanti commenti a quest'opera: Yahyá Ibn 'Adi, un commentatore cristiano della scuola di Baghdad e Averroè . I due autori leggono il testo in modo molto diverso: questo suggerisce una grande differenza tra Averroè e la scuola (...) di Baghdad, sebbene il filosofo andaluso abbia ammirato e seguito il lavoro di al-Farabi. In particolare è naturale il rifiuto da parte di Averroè di introdurre un'inchiesta puramente teologica nella trattazione, punto accettato invece da Ibn 'Adi, secondo il proposito di Averroè di rimarcare il fondamento fisico della metafisica, come è possibile comprendere soprattutto grazie alla lettura del Trattato. (shrink)

Originally published 1959. Ibn ‘Arabi is one of the most significant thinkers of Islam. Yet he is far less widely known in the Western world than Ibn Sina, Al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd or even Al Farabi. This volume provides original interpretations and illustrations to some of Ibn ‘Arabi’s ideas, as well as including a number of his texts in English.

It has been repeatedly stated that Maximus the Confessor’s (c. 580–662) thought is of eminently philosophical interest, and his work has been approached from a philosophical point of view in a number of monographs. However, no dedicated collective scholarly engagement on Maximus the Confessor as a philosopher has been produced. Although Maximus’ treatises reflect a strong philosophical background, prior research has failed to determine with clarity his specific philosophical sources and predilections. Besides apologetic purposes, he referred occasionally to purely philosophical (...) topics, which are more adequate to reveal Maximus’ philosophical education and knowledge. Among these topics are representation and imagination, which have a significant role in epistemology. Maximus’ epistemology proves his dependence on ancient Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle, Stoicism and Alexandrian Neoplatonism. A few centuries later, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Al-Farabi (c.870—c.950), the founder of medieval Arabic philosophy, dealt with the same topics in his epistemology. Al-Farabi’s philosophy has been studied extensively and we have a good idea about his possible sources. There are several indications that Al-Farabi and Maximus the Confessor share common insights, for they resort to the same ancient Greek tradition. In this paper, I attempt to compare Maximus’ and Al-Farabi’s epistemology in order to reveal affinities and differences that permit us to analyze and assess Maximus’ philosophical education. (shrink)

The present volume offers a complete critical Arabic edition of Ibn Ṭumlūs' opus on logic, entitled _Compendium on Logic_ (al-Mukhtaṣar fī al-manṭiq). The text covers all the parts of “the expanded Organon”, as it was known from the time of al-Fārābī to that of Ibn Rushd. With an English and Arabic introduction, notes and indices.

The “Averroism” of Ibn Ṭumlūs (d. 620/1223) has already been attested to by both biographers and textual evidence. Conversely, a close reading of a section in his Kitāb al-Qiyās of his Mukhtaṣar fī al-mantiq (Compendium on Logic) reveals that this “Averroism” has a specific resonance. Unlike Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), Ibn Ṭumlūs belongs to this group of philosophers who dedicated a special section to the examination of jurisprudential inferences, titled by him “al-Qawl fī al-maqāyīs al-fiqhiyyah”, which is a part of (...) his Kitāb al-Qiyās. In this article, first, I will introduce the text of Ibn Ṭumlūs, and present its teaching by placing it in its intellectual context, namely in the light of al-Fārābī’s, al-Ghazālī’s, and Ibn Rushd’s relevant texts. Then, I provide an English translation followed by a critical edition of the Arabic text. The purpose is to highlight the value (and limitations) of Ibn Ṭumlūs’s effort, based on al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Ibn Rushd, to apply Aristotelian syllogistic model to the jurisprudential inferences. (shrink)

This study deals with Dominicus Gundissalinus’s discussion on metaphysics as philosophical discipline. Gundissalinus’s translation and re-elaboration of al-Fārābī’s Iḥṣā’ al-ʿulūm furnish him, in the De scientiis, a specific and detailed procedure for metaphysical analysis articulated in two different stages, an ascending and a descending one. This very same procedure is presented by Gundissalinus also in his De divisione philosophiae, where the increased number of sources –in particular, Avicenna– does not prevent Gundissalinus to quote the entire passage on the methods of (...) metaphysical science from the Iḥṣā’ al-ʿulūm, with some slight changes in his Latin translation. The analytical procedure herein proposed becomes an effective ‘metaphysical programme’ with regards to Gundissalinus’s onto-cosmological writing, the De processione mundi. The comparative analysis of this treatise with the procedure received by al-Fārābī shows Gundissalinus’s effort to follow and apply this metaphysical programme to his own reflection, in a whole different context from al-Fārābī’s and presenting doctrines quite opposed to the theoretical ground on which al-Fārābī’s epistemology is based, like ibn Gabirol’s universal hylomorphism. Nevertheless, thanks to the application of the ‘metaphysical programme’, one can effectively claim that Gundissalinus’s metaphysics is, at least in the author’s intentions, a well-defined metaphysical system. In appendix to this article the three Latin versions of al-Fārābī’s discussion on metaphysics are reported, e.g., Gundissalinus’s quotations in De scientiis and De divisione philosophiae, and Gerard of Cremona’s translation in his De scientiis. (shrink)

In his investigation of the concept of "Being", Aristotle relates the question of "existence" to the question "essence" and considers essence as "whatness" and quiddity. Although in his logical discussions he treats the concepts of "existence" and "whatness" separately and makes a distinction between them, but does not extend this distinction to the area of philosophical topics. But in the prepatetic Islamic system of Philosophy, explanation and distinction between "Being" and "quidity" is without doubt one of the most fundamental philosophical (...) doctrines and beliefs. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the theory of metaphysical distinction between being and essence has been attributed to Ibn Sina, but it is Farabi who for the first time has propounded clearly and decisively a two – part division between "being" and "quiddity" and has prepared the way for Avecinian philosophy. In addition to his logical distinction between "existence" and "whatness" of things he has stressed on a metaphysical distinction between them and has made this distinction the foundation of his metaphysical system. From Farabi's view, being is an inherent accident of quiddity. In this article we try to explain the concepts of "existence" and "whatness" of things and their relation as one of the most fundamental topics in prepatetic philosophy in the philosophical thought of these two great prepatetic philosophers, ie Aristotle and Farabi, with specific stress on comparing their views. (shrink)

È possibile delineare due filoni interpretativi sul _Hayy b. Yaqzān_ (_Il vivente, figlio del desto_) di Ibn Tufayl: secondo l’uno, l’opera è uno sguardo realistico su un solitario in una società corrotta e si ispira agli insegnamenti della _Repubblica_ di Platone; secondo l’altro, l’opera ritrae un ideale puro e astratto di vita ascetica e insiste sull’imperativo morale dell’isolamento. Tuttavia entrambe queste interpretazioni precludono qualsiasi possibilità di felicità per l’uomo o per il filosofo all’interno di una società. In altre parole, tendono (...) a interpretare _Hayy b. Yaqzān_ come un tentativo di dimostrare che l’uomo non sia sociale o politico. La perfezione intellettuale e spirituale ricercata attraverso l’isolamento non può, a mio parere, essere separata da uno scopo pratico. L’isolamento del filosofo non viene praticato per distinguersi dalle società imperfette. Al contrario, tale isolamento è intrapreso per condurlo ad una realizzazione più alta e propriamente pratica. Su questa base, sostengo nell’articolo che l’uomo di Ibn Tufayl sia paragonabile allo ζῷον πολιτικόν aristotelico. Attraverso un confronto tra il _Hayy_ di Ibn Tufayl e lo ζῷον πολιτικόν di Aristotele vedremo come Ibn Tufayl si serva dell’_animale sociale/politico_ arabo (_hayawān insī _o _madanī_) di al-Fārābī e lo trasponga dal dominio della città a quello dell’individuo. Analizzando alcuni passaggi chiave, è possibile chiarire come il concetto di ζῷον πολιτικόν sia entrato nella filosofia araba e in particolare nella concezione di uomo di Ibn Tufayl attraverso il virtuoso di al-Fārābī e il solitario di Ibn Bājja. Prevailing academic views on Ibn Tufayl’s _Hayy b. Yaqzān_ (_Living, the Son of Wakeful_) fall into two camps: either the work is a realistic look at an isolated human being amidst a morally bankrupt population and harks back to the teachings of Plato’s _Republic_, or it portrays a pure and abstract ideal of the spiritual life in the footsteps of the natural first man, and insists on the moral imperative of isolation. The difficulty with both interpretations is that they preclude any possibility of happiness for the human person or the philosopher living in a society. In other words, they tend to interpret _Hayy b. Yaqzān_ as an attempt to demonstrate that the human is not essentially social or political. However, the intellectual and spiritual perfection sought through isolation cannot, in my opinion, be separated from a practical purpose. The isolation of the philosopher is not undergone to distinguish himself from imperfect human societies. On the contrary, such isolation is undertaken in order to lead one to a higher, and properly practical accomplishment. On this basis, I argue in this paper that Ibn Tufayl’s man is comparable to the Aristotelian ζῷον πολιτικόν. Through a comparison of Ibn Tufayl’s _Hayy_ and Aristotle’s ζῷον πολιτικόν we shall see how Ibn Tufayl reuses the Arabic _social/political animal_ (_hayawān insī_ or _madanī_) of al-Fārābī and transposes it from the domain of the city to that of the individual. By analysing some key passages, it becomes possible to illustrate how the concept of ζῷον πολιτικόν has entered Arabic philosophy, and particularly in Ibn Tufayl’s conception of man through the lenses of al-Fārābī’s virtuous and Ibn Bājja’s solitary man. (shrink)

Abraham ibn Daud’s Exalted Faith adapts to rabbinic thought and Jewish tradition the Andalusi Aristotelian model that was the framework for understanding God, man, and man’s purpose in the universe. Ibn Daud defines Jewish belief for the perplexed scholar, arguably providing a genealogy and epistemological justification for the scholarly class—based on acquisition of knowledge of the (Aristotelian) universe and culminating in achieving prophethood. The Aristotelian universe presented in the Exalted Faith offers a version of the elitism Stroumsa argues if at (...) the heart of this Jewish and Muslim scholarly class, one based in Arabic Aristotelian thought. The prevalence of Aristotelian-Farabian (Platonic) philosophy, which held as a central tenet the individual’s ability to know God by developing his intellect through speculation, seemingly offered a religious/societal model in which Jewish traditions and commandments were no longer relevant. Ibn Daud adapts this theory to reassert the necessity for Jewish traditions and to privilege Jewish scholars. to express a vision of individual and social identity for Sephardi scholars in the Diaspora. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to examine two important treatises of the Islamic classical age in the light of utopian discourse. The works considered are the “philosophical novels” Risālat Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān f ī asrār al-ḥikmat al-mašriqiyya (Treatise of the Alive, son of the Awake, on the secrets of oriental wisdom) by Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185) and Risālat Kāmiliyya f ī al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya (Treatise of Kāmil on the Life of the Prophet) by Ibn al-Naf īs (d. 1288). Together with (...) the political writings of al-Fārābī, these works are among the first to be named when considering the possibility of an autonomous utopian tradition in Islam.1 Their relevance to the utopian category has already been shown by other scholars; .. (shrink)

The article analyzes the activity of the greatest classic of the Islamic philosophy - Ibn Sina, aimed at the revision of Aristotelianism, mainly in terms of its synthesis with Islamic monotheism. Preferential attention is paid to the metaphysical section of Avicennian multivolume encyclopedia “The Healing”. Instead of Aristotelian God / the Prime Mover as the final cause, which serves as the source of the movement of the world, Avicenna establishes God / Necessary Being, who acts as the Giver of being. (...) Developing the ontological foundation of creationism, i.e. the creation of every thing in the world, the philosopher introduces a distinction between essence and existence, which will pass through the subsequent history of philosophy. Ibn Sina thoroughly modifies the Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of God and His essential cataphatic attributes. The intellectual narcissism of God, Who only knows Himself in Stagirite, he changes with the concept of Divine Omniscience and His providence of all existents. Ibn Sina transforms Aristotelian eternalism into eternalistic creationism, modifying the emanationist scheme of cosmogenesis advanced by al-Farabi, in which the process of proceeding of the existents from the First Principle appears as an intellectual act. The Muslim philosopher complements Aristotelian cosmology with the doctrine of angels, whom he identifies with cosmic intellects and souls as the governors of the celestial spheres. Avicennian radical innovation is in the doctrine of Active Intellect, who is not only the ruler of the sublunar world, but actually is its demiurge. This intellect is assigned with the function of the illumination of the human intellect, as well as with the role of the archangel Gabriel the transmitter of divine revelation according to Muslim tradition. From the philosophical perspective, Avicenna develops alien to Aristotelianism topics related to the prophecy and revelation, the immortality of the soul and its otherworldly fate. (shrink)

In Sufism, the subject of love or divine love is considered as one of the most valuable concepts and the most important foundations on which the Sufis build their way of knowing Allah. For this reason, it has aroused the interest of many people, especially mystical and literary circles, from different religions, languages, races and cultures since ancient times. If there were no conversation or love, many of the literary texts would not exist today. This phenomenon, which has been handled (...) from different perspectives from past to present, has been subjected to different evaluations, sometimes in a literary text, and sometimes by writing separate treatises and books about it. One of the personalities who dealt with this subject in detail is Ibn Debbâg al-Qayravani, one of the Sufis of the 7th century Hijri. Ibn Debbâğ, like his predecessors Fârâbî, Tevhîdî and Ghazali, is one of the Sufis who consider love together with the theory of beauty and perfection. But what makes it different is that besides the theory of beauty and perfection, the states of lovers, the ways to reach genuine love, the parts of love, the truth of perfection and beauty, spiritual love, the pleasures of fellow devotees... In addition, his recording of mystical states and maqams with shar'i measures, his systematic handling of zahir-bâtın, latîf-kesîf, lofty-suflî concepts and associating them with love form a collection of his ideas. In fact, Ibn Debbâg sheds light on the understanding of Sufism of the period in which he lived, with the way he handled and handled the subject. While all these reveal the importance of our study, they are also the issues that determine its method. On the other hand, the absence of any academic study related to Ibn Debbâg and his understanding of love in our country is one of the main reasons why we prefer this subject. (shrink)

İnsanlardaki nefsin yatkınlık seviyesi ve mizacın denge oranı eşit düzeyde olmadığından onların Ayüstü âlemden ulaşan haber içerikli mesajları kabullerinde farklılıklar ortaya çıkar. Akıl yetisi yetkin, sezgisi kuvvetli, taklit kabiliyeti yüksek olan insanların diğerlerine kıyasla Ayüstü âlemden feyz edileni kabulü güçlüdür. Makalede metafizik tözlerden iletileni kabul eden ve bilinmeyen olaylara ilişkin haber veren insanlar hakkındaki bilgi üç aşamalı olarak verilmiştir: (a) Platon’un şâir, kâhin, âşık arasında yaptığı ayrımın Aristoteles ve Plutarkhos felsefesindeki yeri. (b) İslam öncesi dönemde şâir ile kâhinlerin konumu ve (...) müşrikler tarafından Hz. Muhammed’e hem şâirlik hem de kâhinlik atfedilmesi, Hz. Muhammed’in ayetlerde nebî olarak tanımlanması. (c) Fârâbî’yle İbn Sînâ’nın şâir, kâhin, âşık ve nebîye yükledikleri anlam. Bu çerçevede ‘Hem Fârâbî hem de İbn Sînâ’nın şâir-kâhin hakkındaki fikirlerinin felsefî temelleri ve nebî kavramıyla ilgili görüşlerinin dinî dayanağı nedir’ sorularına cevap aranmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu sorulara yanıt bulmaya gayret gösterilirken nübüvvetin şiir ve kehânetten üstünlüğü göz önünde bulundurularak nebînin şâir, kâhin ve âşıktan farklı olduğunu belirleme hedeflenmiştir. (shrink)

Solomon Ibn Gabirol The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae) TRANSLATED BY Harry E. Wedeck WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY Theodore ...

... as the source of life for the intellectually oriented Jews of the Western world. As such it suffered almost complete sterility right from the start. ...

The first book consecrated to logic, written by an andalusian author is Ibn Hazm’s Kitªb al-taqrÌb li-Êadd al-manðiq (“Introduction to definition of logic”). Where, the author seeks to adapt the logic to the simple language of the jurists. Here it is pointed out how this important treatise can depend on the logical school of Bagdad.